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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

25X1A2g

COUNTRY China

SUBJECT

Military Cliques and Agreements among Chinese Communists, Mongols, and Koreans in Manchuria

ORIGIN

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DATE:

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DIST. 5 December 1946

PAGES 5

SUPPLEMENT

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1. On [REDACTED] a meeting was held at Harbin Garrison Headquarters. The following were present:

- a. Lin Piao, Commander of the Democratic Alliance Army. 25X1A6a
- b. Hsiao Hua, Commander of the Lisotung Area. [REDACTED] Note: Previously identified as Political Commissioner, Liaoning, Kirin, Military Area).
- c. Tsao Li-huai, Commander of the Kirin-Hailungchiang Border Area.
- d. Ma Chi, Commander of the Second Military Area. 25X1A6a
- e. Ia Cheng-tsao, Commander of the 102 Division. [REDACTED] Note: Previously reported as Commander, Jehol-Liaoning Military Area).
- f. Chang Hsueh-sau, President of Northwest University. [REDACTED] Note: Chang Hsueh-shih, younger brother of the Young Marshal).
- g. Wan Yi, Commander of the Second Division.
- h. Chou Pao-chung, Commander of the Northeast People's Army.
- i. Tseng Ke-lin, Commander of the 16th Military Area. 25X1A6a
- j. Pu Tu, representative of the Eastern Mongolian Autonomy Government. [REDACTED] Note: Pu Yen Man Tu?).
- k. Major General Pedrov, representative of the Soviet Army.
- l. Tseng Yu-tien, Korean representative.
- m. Three others, not identified.

2. Chou Pao-chung presided over the meeting.

3. Lin Piao suggested the organization of an Independent Advance Army Unit for the winter offensive. This unit would be divided into three routes: East, West and Central. Each route would have a commander and two vice-commanders. It was

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suggested that each route have two corps each with three regiments. Each corps would have a cavalry regiment. [REDACTED] Note: Source does not clearly state whether the cavalry regiment is in addition to or is one of the original three).

4. The meeting decided to appoint Fu Yen Man Tu as Commander of the East Route Independent Alliance Army and Chou Pao-chung as Commander of the West route. The Commander of the Central route was not disclosed.

For paragraphs one through four inclusive:

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[REDACTED]

- 25X1X6 5. In contemplation of the winter offensive, a secret agreement has been concluded between Lin Piao and Fu Yen Man Tu, chairman of the East Mongolian Autonomy Government. They agreed that two cavalry divisions were to be dispatched from East Mongolia [REDACTED] Note: It is not known whether source means the eastern part of Outer Mongolia, or whether he refers to the area around Wangyehmiao (122-01, 46-05), headquarters of the East Mongolian Autonomy Government). These divisions would have Mongolian officers and six to ten Chinese Communists as directing and liaison officers. Furthermore, one infantry unit, one destroying unit, one political unit, and one artillery battalion would be incorporated into one mixed corps, called the Right Wing Advance Army. It would be organized as follows:

- a. 6 cavalry regiments, with 3,000 men.
- b. 3 infantry detachments, with 450 men.
- c. 1 artillery battalion, with 270 men. It would have three companies.
- d. 1 destroying unit, with about 500 men.
- e. 1 political unit, with about 120 men.

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6. [REDACTED] Note: The following contradictory information/<sup>was</sup> based on a secret interview with an official of the East Mongolian Autonomy Government.)

25X1X6 The East Mongolian Autonomy Government was entirely instigated and encouraged by Soviet Russia. The Mongols are not particularly interested in the Communist cause, and if the Nationalists would put the chairman, Fu Yen Man Tu, into an important government post, the Mongols would follow him over to the Nationalist side. [REDACTED] suggests that General Ma Chan-shan be appointed to negotiate with the Mongols, as he is very popular among Manchurians because of his resistance struggle against the Japanese. (Fu Yen Man Tu and other officials of the present East Mongolian Government used to be high officials of puppet Manchukuo).

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[REDACTED]

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7. There are three major cliques among the Chinese Communists. They are as follows:

a. Soviet Clique

- (1) Chou Fao-chung is the head. He was trained in Russia and came to Manchuria with the Soviet Army after the Japanese surrender. He commands the Northeast Manchurian People's Self-Protection Army. This army is equipped with Soviet weapons, was established to overthrow the imperialist control of Japan, and is not sincerely Communist.

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Note: Chou was previously reported as Commanding Officer, Kirin-Liaoning Military Area).

- (2) Tseng Ke-lin, Chou's subordinate, is sometimes listed in the Soviet Clique, since Chou controls his troops; but he belongs to the Manchurian 8th Route Army Clique.  
(See below).

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- (3) Yu Tien-tang, Harbin Garrison Commander, Note: Also received Yu Tien-feng. Yu Tien-fang? Reported in January to be Chief of Staff, 8th Military Sector at Nanchiang (125-13, 49-11).

b. Yenai Clique

- (1) Lin Piao  
(2) Hsiao Hua  
(3) Ma Chi  
(4) Tsao Li-huai  
(5) The forces of the following men are controlled by Lin Piao, but the men are considered, even by Yenai, to belong to the Manchurian 8th Route Army Clique:

- (a) Lu Cheng-tsao  
(b) Chang Hsueh-shih  
(c) Jan Yi

c. Manchurian 8th Route Army Clique

- (1) Tseng Ke-lin is the head. As explained above, his troops are under the jurisdiction of Chou Pao-chung. These troops are the Northeast People's Autonomy Army, organized after the Japanese surrender. Most of the soldiers are puppet Manchukuo troops and local bad elements. Their morale is low, and they do not believe in any particular doctrine.

- (2) See b (5) above.

For Paragraph 7:

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8. If the Chinese Nationalist Government adopted effective political and tactical means of pacifying the Soviet Clique, disunity between them and the Yen-an Clique could easily materialize. If Ma Chan-shan were appointed to an important government post in Manchuria, the Yen-an Clique would surrender. If these two cliques were effectively united, the dissolution of the third, the Manchurian 8 Route Army Clique, would be a certainty.

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25X1D 9. [REDACTED] LIN Piao called another secret meeting in Harbin Garrison Headquarters. The following were present:

a. Chinese Communists:

Lin Piao  
Lu Cheng-tsao  
Chou Fao-chung  
Yu Tien-fang  
Liu Cheng-tung, Mayor of Harbin  
Hsieh Yu-chin, Sino-Soviet Friendship Representative  
Commissioner Feng Chung-yun. (Previously reported as Chairman (Governor) of Sungchiang Province)  
Chairman Sung Chi-wen. (Area not stated)  
Commander Wang Feng. (Unit not stated)  
12 others.

b. Representatives of the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government:

Kuo Wen-lin, Military Affairs Minister  
High advisor Ma Ta Mu Teh  
7 others

c. Koreans:

25X1X6 [REDACTED] Note: The names in the original report were given in Chinese romanization, and no characters were supplied.

Lin Chan-chung, North Korean Military Commissioner.  
Chang Tien-shun, Korean Northeast Army Commander.  
Chin Ping, North Korean Youth Training Institute Chief.  
4 others.

d. Representatives of C.D.L., Soviet Secret Organization:

25X1X6 [REDACTED] Note: It is not known for what the initials stand.)

Sung Peng-yueh (Korean)  
Chin Wen-chun whose address is #174 Yen San Li, Kon San Kun, South Chung Cheng Prefecture, Central Korea.

e. The following decisions were reached:

- (1.) The offices of the North Korean administration will be at Yenchi (129-31, 42-55).
- (2.) The North Korean Military Headquarters will be established at Tungfossu (129-15, 42-53).
- (3.) The North Korean Youth Training Institute will be established at Lungchingtsun (129-26, 42-45).

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- (4.) Korean youths in Yenchi, Huling (133-38, 45-59) /<sup>7</sup> Holung, 129-33, 42-38/ Huichu /<sup>7</sup> Hunchun, 130-22, 42-52/ and Nantu /<sup>7</sup> Antu, 128-22, 42-31/ districts will be controlled by the North Korean Commissioner.
- (5.) The Youths' Self-Protection Army, now stationed at Yenchi, Lungchingsun, and Talatzu /Holung/ will be moved to Tatuchuan /Tungfeng/ (125-31, 42-41, Chingyang (? Chingyuan, 124-55, 42-04), and Miaoling (124-55, 42-12) before 1 October.
- (6.) One cavalry division of the East Mongolian troops will be sent to Angangchi (125-48, 47-09).

25X1A6a [REDACTED] Note: The correct coordinates for Angangchi should read 123-48, 47-09. Possibly Anchangchen, 125-15, 42-59, is meant, see paragraph 4, page 2.

25X1X [REDACTED]

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